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DISCIPLINE IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN ONTARIO
S. ARTHURS*
Introduction
This is a study of one aspect of discipline in the legal profession of
Ontario. Through a study of disbarred lawyers it is hoped that there may
emerge a clearer view of those factors which may have contributed to the
behaviour which incurs the Law Society's ultimate punishment.
The study is based on data from the Law Society's files of 80 lawyers
disbarred between 1945 and 1965 in Ontario. Although 93 lawyers were
disbarred during this period, it was possible to obtain information concerning
only 80.
Not all the Law Society's files which were obtained were complete.
In some cases the files included information on the education of the lawyer,
the nature of his practice, and records of the disbarment investigation and
proceedings.
In addition, much of the necessary background data is unavailable. For
example, it is not known how many lawyers are in solo practice, or what
percentage of the bar is in each specialty. There is a study, however, of
Canadian lawyers published in 1950 and 19511 which provides some back-
ground information.
Any consideration of behaviour and the circumstances surrounding
misconduct must take into account the rules governing a lawyer's conduct
and their enforcement by the Law Society. Without these rules, which reflect
its values, the profession would wither. But there is a hierarchy of values;
since not all values are basic to the survival of the group, they are not accepted
*S. Arthurs received her B.A. and M.A. from the University of Toronto. She is
presently a Research Associate at the Clarke Institute of Psychiatry in Toronto.
1 John P. Nelligan, Lawyers in Canada: A Half-Century Count, (1950) 28 CAN.
B. RnV.; Income of Lawyers, (1951) 29 cAN. B. aV.
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as equally important by all the members of that group. This differential
acceptance is reflected by differential enforcement. The greatest penalty,
disbarment, appears to be reserved for those offences which likely threaten
the group's existence as an independent entity. For those infractions which
offend only the legal community, and likely only a small portion of it, lesser
sanctions are imposed.
Finally, in addition to examining the rules, the disapproved behaviour,
and the circumstances surrounding it, it will be necessary to look at as much
of the lawyer's background as possible. Neither legal training nor legal culture
overrides the effect of the various situations in which lawyers find themselves
and from which they came to the practice of law.2
Official Framework: The Law Society
The legal profession of Ontario is officially governed by the Law Society
of Upper Canada. This organization has power to make rules and set standards
of behaviour for its members. Behind these rules and standards are the right
and power of enforcement. Since this is a study of lawyers who have deviated
from acceptable norms of behaviour and have been sanctioned by disbarment,
it is necessary first to consider the official framework within which the norms
are set and decisions to sanction are taken.
The legal profession in Ontario is self-governing both by tradition
and by statute. Under the Law Society Act, Barristers Act, and Solicitors
Act, membership in the Law Society of Upper Canada is required for the
practice of law. The legal profession of Ontario is therefore "integrated" in
the sense that every lawyer must be a member of the professional society.
As part of this system of self-government, the elected governing body of the
Society, the Benchers, are by the Law Society Act empowered to exercise
disciplinary power over the members.3 The most severe sanction, disbarment,
therefore simultaneously removes a lawyer from membership in the Society
and from his status as a legal practitioner. The legislation does not set out
any rules of conduct which lawyers must follow,4 so that the Law Society's
power to make rules governing its members is actually a power to fix standards
of professional behaviour.
What are the rules, then, according to which a member is judged guilty
of professional misconduct and disbarred? The only collection of "rules" or
norms of professional behaviour is the Professional Conduct Handbook. This
Handbook was issued by the Professional Conduct Committee of the Benchers
with the approval of the governing body, in 1964. It is not intended to be
exhaustive, and its contents are regarded merely as indicative guidelines,
rather than definitive standards of conduct. The one exception to this general-
2 lerome E. Carlin, LAWYERS' ETMCS. A SURVEY OF TEE NEW YORK BAR, Russell Sage
Foundation, 1966. Carlin's study of legal ethics in the New York City Bar empirically
tests this hypothesis; see Chapter 3 of his book.
8Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1960, c. 200, s. 44.
4Id. s. 43.
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ization is the "Rules Respecting Accounts." That there are rules concerning
accounts rather than rulings or guidelines likely reflects the Law Society's
special interest in this area. Violations of these rules will almost certainly
lead to disciplinary action.
Neither in the Handbook, nor in any other official document, are
specific penalties established for infractions of the Rules Respecting Accounts
or of the other rulings. The Law Society Act sets forth the penalties that the
Benchers can impose--disbarment, suspension and expulsion-but it does
not specify which are to be imposed for particular acts. The Handbook itself
simply warns that "The Benchers... shall have power to treat any infringe-
ment of these rules or any failure to comply therewith as professional mis-
conduct? ' 5 Thus, the situation is one of vague rules and unpredictable
sanctions, the discretion of the Law Society controlling both, case by case.
The permanent staff of the Law Society is the first agency to be formally
notified about a lawyer's behaviour, usually as the result of complaints from
clients or other lawyers. In this situation, the lawyer is usually sent a copy
of the complaint and his reply is requested. Failure to reply in itself constitutes
professional misconduct.6 When the reply is received with the lawyer's
explanation, it is considered by the Secretary of the Law Society, in some
cases in consultation with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Discipline
Committee. If the lawyer's explanation appears satisfactory, the complainant
is so advised and the matter closed. This is one stage at which a decision is
made as to whether the behaviour is "professional misconduct."
However, some complaints are not disposed of so quickly. Investigation
of the complaint may reveal, for example, a lawyer's delay, neglect or failure
to inform his client about the progress of a case. In these instances the Law
Society aids the complainant by following through transactions, prodding
the lawyer, requiring a report when the matter has been completed or by its
very presence acting as a catalyst to remedial action by him.
There is another means by which the Law Society becomes aware of
possible misconduct. These are unannounced random audits which the Law
Society conducts throughout the province. Auditors employed by the Law
Society examine the books and trust accounts of lawyers in different locales
each year. These examinations can uncover irregularities which may result in
a more detailed audit or a report from a Chartered Accountant advising
that the irregularities have been corrected and that the lawyer's accounts
comply with the Rules Respecting Accounts.
In the case of trust account irregularities, a notice is sent to the lawyer
advising him to make all his records available to the Law Society auditor
or his agent.7 The auditor's report, which is sent to the Law Society Secretary,
outlines the nature of the lawyer's practice, his method of bookkeeping, and
5 PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK, Law Society of Upper Canada, Rules Respect-
ing Accounts; Rule 14, p. 4.
6 Id. Ruling 20, p. 47.
7 Id. Rule 11(1), p. 3; also Law Society Act, s. 43(e).
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the apparent disposition of the money which was the subject of the complaint,
or which seemed to have been improperly dealt with, and possibly, further
trust fund shortages.
On receipt of this report, assuming it indicates shortages the Secretary
drafts a formal Notice of Complaint, with the Discipline Committee's
approval, and sets a hearing date. The procedure of the hearing is the same
throughout for "neglect" complaints as well as for shortages, for example.
At the hearing, the lawyer usually is present (in some cases with counsel)
as are the Secretary of the Law Society, the investigating auditor and the
complainant. The Discipline Committee and the lawyer's counsel question
the witnesses. Evidence is tendered by the Secretary of the Law Society to
show that the lawyer's behaviour amounts to misconduct. The Committee
then decides whether there has been misconduct, and if so, what the disposi-
tion of the matter ought to be.
Its findings and recommendations are reported to Convocation, the
plenary body of the Benchers. This report is also sent to the lawyer in
question, and he is advised of the date on which Convocation will consider his
case. On that date the lawyer and his counsel can appear and make representa-
tions to Convocation, which then confirms or varies the Discipline Committee's
recommendations.
There are a number of verdicts which the Discipline Committee and
Convocation may reach. They may decided to dismiss the complaint, if, for
example, there is insufficient evidence to indicate misconduct or "poor
practice". The remaining possibilities are: reprimand by the Discipline
Committee; reprimand in Convocation; suspension for a specified time;
resignation; disbarment.
Reprimand by the Discipline Committee itself is usually reserved for
cases involving no serious professional misconduct, but instances of "poor
practice". Here, the Discipline Committee requires an undertaking by the
lawyer, and he is admonished to change his ways. Rather more serious,
although essentially similar is the sanction of reprimand in Convocation.
Reprimands, whether in Committee or in Convocation, may or may
not be made public; and if they are reported, the individual is not always
named. Reporting depends upon whether the Law Society views the case
as a serious matter. If it does, the naming of the individual is used as a
form of punishment. If the case merely illustrates a practice or principle
which the Law Society feels should be brought to the attention of the
profession, the Society will note the behaviour leading to reprimand, but
not the individual's name.
Notices of suspension are published in the daily press and the Ontario
Reports, stating the individual's name, the period of his suspension and the
reason for suspension.
Those who are allowed to "resign at their own request" generally are
involved as well in "poor practice", but tend to be older lawyers who may
be ill or senile. They must undertake never to practice again in order to escape
censure.
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Disbarments are reported in the press and Ontario Reports, giving
the individual's name and generally stating the cause for disbarment. In
addition, a disbarred lawyer cannot be employed in any capacity by another
lawyer nor can he share office space with him.8 Thus, both his livelihood and
his reputation are affected. In some cases, the findings of Convocation are
given to the Crown Attorney for the purpose of preparing a criminal charge.
In Ontario, there is (at the time of writing) no appeal to the courts
from a decision of Convocation. That is, there is no appeal on the facts of
the case; although, challenge can be made on the basis of a "denial of natural
justice" or an error in law. In the period 1945-65, there was one such appeal
and the Law Society's decision was overturned. 9
The only route to reinstatement lies through an application to the
disciplining body itself. Although there is no right to reinstatement, applica-
tions are sometimes considered and lawyers are reinstated occasionally. Of
the 93 lawyers disbarred between 1945-65, six had been reinstated or were
making application. There do not appear to be any set rules regarding
reinstatement. Generally, it could be said that a lawyer must have repaid
any claims made against him for defalcation, and shown signs of rehabilitation.
Applications for reinstatement are usually supported by petitions from lawyers
in good standing and "responsible" people in the community, such as bank
managers, previous employers and clergymen. Decisions are made on the
basis of individual considerations.
Analysis of the Data
93 lawyers were disbarred betwen 1945 and 1965. Grouping the
number disbarred into five year periods, we found an increase over time:
in 1945-1949 13% of the total were disbarred; 16%in 1950-1954; 20%
in 1955-59; 51% in 1960-65. The increase in the number of disbarments
is not solely the result of the increased number of lawyers. 10 The number of
lawyers almost doubled from the 1951 census to the year 1966, while
disbarments increased fourfold from 1945-1949 to 1960-65. That the period
1960-1965 shows an absolute as well as relative increase may reflect in part
the intensified surveillance and changed attitude by the profession toward
defaulting lawyers which developed during this period.
The number disbarred has decreased since 1964. In 1966 there were
three disbarments, and there was an equal number in each of the two following
years. This decrease could be a by-product of the deterrent and control aspects
of the Law Society's measures.
8 Id. Ruling 9, p. 25.
9 Mehr v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [1955] S.C.R. 344.
10The 1951 Census indicates 3,388 lawyers practising in Ontario. CENSUS OF
CANADA, 1951, v. 4, Table 4, p. 2. In 1961 there were 4,902 lawyers. CENSUS OF
CANADA, 1961, v. 3. 1-3, p. 5. In 1966, there were approximately 6,150 lawyers. The
Law Society provided this figure. Inquiries were made to obtain from them the annual
count of lawyers from 1945 through 1965; however, this information was not available.
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Reasons for Disbarment
Let us now examine more closely the kinds of infractions which brought
about disbarment. In the following table, the phrases at the left can be seen
as describing offences in which these disbarred lawyers were involved.
TABLE 1
BEHAVIOUR LEADING TO DISBARMENT"
Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
Improper use of trust funds:
Received money in trust and not 2 25
put into trust account: .......... 25% 83%
Trust account overdrawn:
Misappropriation of trust funds: .............. 46 58
Forgery/Fraud: ........................................ 5 6
Neglect (does nothing on a case
or keeps money received for a case): 6 8
Other (assault, divorce collusion): ........ 2 3
Total ........................................................ 79 100%
If we consider the first four charges as part of the same behavioural
constellation, we see that 83% of the lawyers were disbarred for misappro-
priation of clients' funds and related activities. Money was received in trust
and was used by the lawyer for his own purposes. This concentration of
discipline in one area could indicate that the Law Society has a great concern
with trust violations. It might be hypothesized that if the Law Society did
not control this area as assiduously as it does the profession might be made
subject to some form of external regulation. Clearly, infraction of these
rules of conduct can imperil the autonomy of the profession, and thus
threatened, the profession deals as firmly as it can with offenders.
In the 20 cases of trust fund mishandling where the charge was not
misappropriation, one might wonder why the lesser sanctions of suspension
or reprimand were not imposed. Accordingly, we looked for factors which
might have been used to justify disbarment. The files of 8 of the 20 cases
of "lesser" trust fund violations hinted at possible misappropriation. In 4
of these cases personal debts were mentioned as a reason for an overdrawn
account or mixing trust funds with general office monies. In the other 4,
the lawyer's investments in land development or companies were pointed to.
The files of the remaining 12 lawyers indicated neglect of the client's interests,
and prior complaints for this same behaviour.
11 See, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HANDBOOR, Rules Respecting Accounts, for the first
three charges. Persons in the first four categories listed in the table frequently were
charged as well with failure to keep proper books of accounts (Rules 7 and 8) and often
non-reply to the Law Society's letters, (Ruling 20).
240 [VOL. 7, NO. 3
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Since there are no fixed penalties for infractions of the rules and rulings,
it appears likely that past behaviour affected the decision to disbar. 10 of
the 20 had been reprimanded and/or suspended in the past, in three cases
for similar activities. Five of the suspensions were for failure to pay the annual
Law Society fees, possibly indicating the lawyer's need for money. All but
three, had had complaints lodged against them in the past.
The forgery/fraud cases did not appear to involve misuse of clients'
trust funds. Examples would be forging a mortgage document or advising that
a mortgage had been obtained when, in fact, one did not exist. The con-
nection between this activity and conversion of trust funds to one's own
use can be seen in the case in which a mortgage is not placed, though false
papers are given to the client, and the money is used by the lawyer for his
own purposes.
The "neglect" cases would be those in which a lawyer was given a fee
to handle a case, or money to turn over in a transaction, but he delayed or
neglected to do what he was supposed to do. In these cases, it did not appear
that he converted any of the money to his own use. In three of these six
cases, the lawyer failed to attend to a client's lawsuit, so that it was lost by
default. As we have indicated, these are cases of "general" neglect in which
the lawyer is not carrying out his duties in practice.
Explanations Offered by the Lawyers
Accepting that this behaviour did not occur at random, we must try
to go beyond the acts in order to understand them more fully. First let us
look at the reasons which the lawyers, or witnesses on their behalf, gave for
their behaviour.
TABLE 2
REASONS FOR BEHAVIOUR LEADING TO DISBARMENT
Number of Percentage
Disbarred
Lawyers
Investm ents .................................................................. 20 33%
Personal debts .............................................................. 13 22
Illness-Mental ......................................... 6 8 13
- Physical ....................................... 2
A lcohol ........................................................................ 8 13
G am bling ...................................................................... 4 7
"Poor" lawyer
(Unable to run office; mistakes) .................................. 4 7
M iscellaneous ................................................................ 3 5
Total ............................................................................ 60 100%
The "investments" category includes debts arising out of investments, so
that the "personal debts" category can be considered as a separate one. The
investments involved, for example, land development schemes, finance com-
panies, and mining speculation. While many files may have indicated that
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
a lawyer had a history of physical or mental illness, only those lawyers who
gave this as a reason for their behaviour were included in this category. Tied
to such categories as alcohol, gambling and debts was "carelessness". How-
ever, this did not appear to stand out as an independent cause, but rather
as an example of circular reasoning. Carelessness and debts may have created
problems. Unable to cope' with the problems, these lawyers began to drink,
gamble, or became ill. This in turn led to further carelessness and debts.
A time or "causal" sequence could not be isolated in these cases.
Generally, people appear to act in ways which are consistent with their
roles. Thus, members of the legal profession, for the most part, appear to
conform to the behaviour expected of them. Should a conflict arise between
what they wish to do and generally held expectations, the latter usually prevail.
When the "wish" prevails, it is not unusual to discover that the individual has
altered temporarily his perception of the extent to which the role "fits" him.'2
Upon examination of the "reasons" for behaviour leading to disbarment,
one point emerges clearly. This is the contrast between what a lawyer "ought
to be" and what these lawyers did. The lawyer's primary role is that of a
trusted person, one to whom the public entrusts its important matters.
However, the majority of those disbarred manifestly violated the trust ethic
through misappropriation, other faudulent activities or neglect.
What the "reasons" suggest is the disbarred lawyers' denials that they
were acting as a trusted person in the instances in question. Therefore, the
inconsistency between what lawyers "ought to be" and what these lawyers
did is removed in their own minds in this instance. Comments made by or
for the lawyers indicated that they had "borrowed" the money or their practice
was "non-law" or that they were not in control of the situation.
Thus, one of the lawyers in this group said he had "borrowed" from the
fund to meet heavy expenses, while another used the money "temporarily"
for a second mortgage on his home. Consistent with the idea of borrowing,
a third "needed a few more months and all obligations would have been
covered." A fourth lawyer implied he was not wholly accountable for his
situation in that a retainer he had had of $350 per month suddenly stopped,
and his nerves became so bad he could not handle any problems. Another
submitted that his age had something to do with his carelessness and inability
to cope with the Law Society's rules respecting accounts. Yet another saw
himself as "caught" in the collapse of the real estate market. Some stated that
they received no personal benefit from the activity, but that the activities of
others led to their problem, since they assumed the obligations of others.
The remaining "reasons" include the hazards of solo practice, their own
"stupidity," alcohol, gambling, and illness. In all of these examples, we can
see how the trust ethic might be felt to be suspended.
12 For those interested in some of the sociological literature relating to this point,
see: Donald R. Cressey, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, The Free Press, 1953; Erving Goffman
On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of Adaptation to Failure in Arnold M. Rose
(ed), HuMAN DEHAViOUR AND SOCIAL PRoCEssES, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1962;
David Matza, DELINQUENCY AM DRIFT, John Wiley and Sons, 1964.
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Analysis of "Reasons" Offered
While the lawyers, or others for them, have provided "reasons" for the
behaviour which brought them before the Law Society, we would like to
pursue the "reasons", not psychologically, but with regard to the circumstances
in which these lawyers practised. What aspects in the legal lives of these
lawyers could be seen as producing strains which contributed to deviant
behaviour in this area? For the most part, the lawyers who were disbarred
were what might be called "marginal" lawyers. Marginality in this regard
appears to result from the conjunction and interplay of a number of factors:
primarily solo practice, general or real estate practice, and involvement in
"extra-legal" business.
TABLE 3
NUMBER IN FIRM WHEN DISBARRED
Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
Disbarred lawyer alone: .............................................. 61 81%
Disbarred lawyer and 1 associate or partner: ............ 8 11
Disbarred lawyer as an employee: .............................. 4 5
Disbarred lawyer and 2 or more associates or partners 2 3
Total ............................................................................ 75 100%
As can be seen from Table 3, 81% of those for whom there was data
practised alone. A survey of the legal profession in 1950 indicated that 43 %
of all lawyers in Ontario were in solo practice. 13 In 1966, approximately 21%
of the Ontario lawyers were in solo practice.1 4 The 81% in this group of
disbarred lawyers is disproportionately higher than the percentage of lawyers
in solo practice in the general lawyer population, given any rough approxima-
tion of the trend from 1950 through to 1966. We suggest that solo practice
13John P. Nelligan, Lawyers in Canada: A Half-Century Count p. 749; see
footnote 1. Blaustein and Porter, Tim AMEIcAN LAWYER, The University of Chicago
Press, 1954, pp. 8-10, has 1952 figures and indicates 68% in solo practice in the
United States and 70% in Manhattan and the Bronx, New York City. Carlin's 1966
study of the New York City Bar states that 47% of the lawyers were in individual
practice. LAWYERS' ETmCS. p. 18, see footnote 2. If this is the pattern, then we could
expect a decrease in the Ontario figures.
14 This is based on a count from the 1966 Canadian Law List. The percentage in
solo practice is likely somewhat higher than 21% for the following reasons:
(1) Some persons listed in "association" may be so in name only. They may have a
shared space and secretarial arrangement with each lawyer having his own set of
books and separate practice.
(2) Some persons listed as partners may in fact practice alone, because of the death,
retirement or inactivity of the other member of the firm.
(3) Some persons listed as an employer may operate for "trust" purposes as a solo
practitioner, handling his own trust accounts, books and cheques. We were unable to
use the 1961 Canada Census data. They have only two categories: wage-earner and self-
employed. The latter includes solo practitioners, partners, those in large firms, and all
groups except employees.
19691
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has its own special problems which could play a part in behaviour leading
to disbarment. In fact, one gets the impression from some of the data that
if a lawyer had formerly been in partnership, his trouble began when he
entered solo practice. While the change itself could have been unsettling and
led to strains, it seemed rather that the lawyers' comments pointed to features
in solo practice itself. One file indicated that complaints about this lawyer's
practice arose when he first began to practice alone. Two others indicated
bookkeeping problems and debts, and a third, investments, all following
entry into solo practice. That none of these incidents arose or led to trouble
when the individuals concerned practiced in association suggests either a
higher income then or the "control" feature of associates. The latter pos-
sibility is raised by the fact that trust funds would not be "available" for
personal use if all the associates maintained some control over the withdrawal
of funds. Informal control mechanisms exist by the very fact that someone
else might become aware of "unethical" practices, which in itself could lead
to problems, such as dismissal or dissolution of the association.
The data indicate that we are dealing with a particular type of solo
practitioner, one whose practice is primarily in the areas of conveyancing,
mortgages and general law. This lawyer practices without the colleaguial
support of those in larger firms, and his practice is more subject to his
clients' influence.' 5
TABLE 4
NATURE OF PRACTICE
Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
Conveyancing/mortgages: ........................ 28 46%
General (estate, collection, 84%
insurance, division court, criminal): ........ 23 38 )
Divorce: .................................................... 4 7
M ining: .................................................... 4 7
Labour: .................................................... 1 1
Commercial/corporate: ............................ 1 1
Total ........................................................ 61 100%
15E. 0. Smigel, THE WALL STREET LAWYER, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964,
p. 263. Smigel points not only to the control exercised by colleagues in the large law
firm, but that of clients as well. Many of them are knowledgeable in the law, know what
procedures their lawyers should take, and are also concerned with the business image
which the law firm may reflect. See also Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law
as Confidence Game, (1967), 1 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 31, n. 20; and Dietrich
Rueschemeyer, Doctors and Lawyers, A Comment on the Theory of the Professions,
(1964), THE cANADN R ViEw OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 24.
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Table 4 indicates that 84% of the disbarred lawyers were in a convey-
ancing, mortgage, or general practice.' 6 Conveyancing and general practice
appear here as two distinct categories, although a number of files suggested
a practice encompassing both areas. For most purposes, the 84% can be
seen as one group.
This kind of practice usually centres around one of two types of
clients-the individual with a "one-shot" transaction, or the real estate
investor or speculator. The former is not as profitable as those lawyer-client
relationslips in which the client is a business. As a 1951 study of the legal
profession indicated ".... law firms serving individuals do not as a general
rule make as large an income as those deriving.., income from business
sources."' 7 This study goes on to say that in Ontario those firms which
received 80% or more of their income from individuals made slightly less
than half the income of the other firms. In addition, the study affirms that
solo practice is generally associated with an individual clientele 8 and thus,
a conveyancing and general practice. This discussion of low income does not
necessarily apply to the lawyer with investors and speculators as clients.
Often they do well. But, for them, there are pressures and/or opportunities
to invest in their clients' enterprises which, as we have seen in Table 2, led
to the need for money and misappropriation.
Conveyancing and general practice is considered within the legal
profession, and likely without, as "lower-lever' law. It does not have the
prestige of litigation, tax or corporate law practice. Where prestige does attach
to this kind of work, it reflects the complexity and importance of transactions
undertaken for very large business enterprises. Further, many "lower-level"
law problems can be, and are, handled by lay people such as real estate
brokers, insurance companies and mortgage brokers, placing the lawyer in
competition with laymen. Thus, a lawyer involved in this type of practice
is in a "marginal" position vis-,:-vis his profession and the business world.
This marginality can often lead to unethical behaviour, especially when
aggravated by the low and fluctuating income of the solo practitioner with
individual clients. 19
161 do not know how representative of the total Bar the practice breakdown is
for the disbarred lawyers. Since the Law Society of Upper Canada does not list
practice specialties and lawyers are cautioned against listing themselves as specialists,
this information is not readily available.
17John P. Neligan, Income of Lawyers, p. 47; see footnote 1. Blaustein and
Porter's data (p. 11, see footnote 13) from the Office of Business Economics of the U.S.
Department of Commerce indicate that the solo practitioner's income is lower than that
of partners and members of law firms.
Is Nelligan, Income of Lawyers, p. 46-47; see footnote 1. Nelligan found that solo
practitioners received 80% of their income from individual clients.
19 See Jerome E. Carlin, LAWYERs ON THEmiR owN, Rutgers, 1962, which is primarily
devoted to this and the foregoing discussion. In LAWYERs' ETHCS, A SURVEY OF THE NEW
YORK cny BAR, pp. 66-69, Carlin found that low status clients, that is those with
individual problems, provided the lawyer with an unstable income. This fact, combined
with competition from other lawyers and lay people were factors in the violation of
basic bar norms, e.g. taking advantage of clients.
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Primarily, these "marginal" lawyers were those who were disbarred for
trust fund violations.20 They either needed the money to meet personal
debts, some attributable to drinking or gambling, or debts which arose out
of speculation.21 The latter activity became available to them in the course
of their practice and often reflected the type of real estate development in
which their clients were engaged. The same could be said for those in a
mining practice whose speculation involved mining stock.
Of the four lawyers involved primarily in divorce practice, two were
disbarred for general neglect in that they received fees for cases, but did
nothing and did not refund the fees. The other two were engaged in general
practice as well and were disbarred for forging a mortgage and for stealing
stock certificates from an estate. All of them had a history of client complaints
over delays in proceeding with actions. In three of the four cases, the Law
Society took an active part in seeing that matters were concluded or, as one
file indicated, the Law Society would be "supervising your conduct". Delay
in divorce cases was suggested by one of the Law Society auditors as endemic
in this type of practice. He indicated that unless a lawyer reported fully and
periodically to his clients, carelessness would lead to trouble. Possibly what
we see here is characteristic of an approach to the practice of law, its
standards and ethics. This apparent minimal commitment could be seen as a
factor in the subsequent activity which resulted in disbarment. This point
is underlined by the case of another lawyer engaged in general practice, but
with some divorce work. He was disbarred for arranging perjured evidence
of adultery.
The one individual in labour law did not handle trust funds and was
disbarred for assault. The lawyer in commercial/corporate practice had
violated the trust fund regulations, although there was no definite indication
that he had used clients' money for his own purposes. However, in recent
years, he had spent considerable time away from practice pursuing a hotel
development scheme out of the country.
In their "reasons" for disbarment, 33 % of the lawyers claimed they were
driven to take trust funds in order to protect their own investments. This led
us to consider not only the nature of the investments in which these lawyers
were involved, but also the fact of "extra-legal" business generally.
20 Of the fifty-one lawyers in a conveyancing and/or general practice, only seven
were not disbarred for trust fund violations.
21 There were also some in this category who pleaded illness as a factor.
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TABLE 5
"EXTRA-LEGAL" BUSINESS
A.
Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
Not involved in "extra-legal" business: ........................ 49 61%
Involved in "extra-legal" business: ............................ 31 39%
Total ............................................................................ 80 100%
B.
Type of Business Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
Investments-general: ............................... 11 36% 59%
Land development: ................................ 7 23
Companies: .............................................. 6 19
M ining: .................................................... 5 16
O ther: ...................................................... 2 6
Total: ...................................................... 31 100%
39% of all disbarred lawyers had "extra-legal" business. The greatest
number (59%) were active in either general investments or land development,
which are the types of opportunities encountered in a conveyancing or
general practice. While 84% of all disbarred lawyers were engaged in these
two types of practice (Table 4), 74% of those with extra-legal business
were practicing as conveyancers or doing general work. Obviously, their
practices would put them in contact with individuals dealing in property,
or lending and borrowing money, and afford them opportunities for invest-
ment either alone or in conjunction with their clients.
The "investments" were not the usual stocks or bonds held by many
people, including lawyers. Rather, they were highly speculative and forced
the lawyer to spend increasing amounts of time and money on them. As to
time, one lawyer indicated that his practice dropped off with his involvement
in a company. He had been doing well, but since his practice had gone
downhill, and his investment in the company was also shaky, he tried to
protect it by using trust funds as a source of additional capital. A second
stated that he was more involved in the mortgage and investment business
than in legal work.22
The costs of the "investment" were seldom met by a single initial
payment. If the investment were speculative, additional money was often
required to meet contingencies to avoid losing the entire deal. This is where
22 In THE LAW SOCmTY GAZETTE, a publication designed to further communication
between the Law Society and its members, the Vice-Chairman of the Discipline Com-
mittee raises the issue of lawyers "substantially engaged in 'business'." He indicates this
as a factor in misappropriation and suggests a restriction on this activity. See Gordon
W. Ford, Q.C., Notes on the Discipline Committee, (1967) 1 THE LAW SOCIETY
GAZETrE 27.
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trust funds came in. Those who hoped to meet debts or make a quick profit,
were often faced with an investment which collapsed, leaving them even
further behind. In one case, the lawyer stated that his investments in a
declining real estate market led to his use of trust funds, as did another
who was "caught in the collapse of the real estate market in 1959". Another
two indicated generally that they had lost money in their investments and
used the trust funds for personal loans and expenses.
We can see the effects of solo practice in this sphere. With the possibility
of a low professional income often found in solo, general practice, a "quick-
return" profit in speculative areas may appear very attractive. If the invest-
ment requires additional money or falls through, leaving the lawyer in debt,
there are no other members in the firm to act as "watchdog" over the use
of clients' funds. In some instances of speculation, the lawyer and client
are partners. If his "business" partner is a major client, the lawyer may be
subject to particularly strong pressure to continue his financial interest
because the client is also the source of legal work. The lawyer may meet
this pressure through the use of trust funds belonging to other clients. In
contrast to larger firms, there may not be many clients with continuing
business.
Thus, we can see among some of the disbarred lawyers, a cluster of factors
-solo, general practice and an involvement in "extra-legal" business, which
may have accounted in some measure for their professional misconduct.
By examining their careers, we may be able to get some idea of the sequence
of events which led to disbarment. Specifically, how did they practice law?
Was disbarment their first encounter with the Law Society, or does it appear
that they had been practising in such a way that the behaviour which resulted
in disbarment was a "logical" sequel to prior events?
There are a number of indications of prior difficulties in practice: failure
to pay annual fees, complaints by dissatisfied clients, reprimands and sus-
pension by the Law Society.
40% of these disbarred lawyers had been in arrears of the Law
Society's annual fees.23 69% of these had 1 or 2 years in arrears, and
31% *were between 3 to 8 years behind. This could suggest that there may
have been a low income period for lawyers in the first group and a more
sustained low income period for the second. This suggestion is consistent
with the fact that lawyers alone in a general practice have a lower income
than their counterparts in other forms of practice.
80% of these "marginal" lawyers (solo, general practice, and "extra-
legal" business) had complaints lodged against them with the Law Society
prior to and distinct from the specific incident which led to disbarment. Of
those with complaints on their record, 73% were the subject of between one
to five complaints, 11% between six and nine and 16%, ten or more.
MThe Law Society does not have the percentage of the Bar with fees in arrears.
We are unable to draw any comparisons between our population and the general one.
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There did not appear to be any substantial difference between those with
and those without complaints, or between those with a large number and
those with few. They had a similar type of law practice and were disbarred
for trust fund violations. Generally, if an individual had been in partnership
complaints against him began with solo practice.
In order to ascertain if the 80% or the number of complaints
received by each is significantly high, we would have to sample the total
lawyer population. What percentage of lawyers are the subject of complaints,
and how many complaints? More specifically, what percentage in a convey-
ancing and/or general practice have complaints lodged against them.24 It may
well be that this type of law practice is particularly conducive to client dis-
satisfaction in that matters may never appear to move as swiftly as or produce
the result the client expected.
15% of the disbarred lawyers had been reprimanded previously by the
Law Society. By and large, these reprimands resulted from clients' com-
plaints concerning a neglected case or other type of delay. The Law Society's
investigation often revealed a failure to maintain proper books of accounts,
or overdrawn trust funds, as well as lack of co-operation by the lawyer
evidenced by failure to reply to the Law Society's requests for explanations.
Suspensions, for a fixed period of time, had been imposed upon 20%
of the lawyers prior to disbarment. In a few additional cases, suspension was
used as a "stop-gap" procedure pending further investigation which resulted
in disbarment. Investigations resulting in suspension uncovered practices
such as negligent handling of cases and indications of conversion. In addition,
where a lawyer had been in arrears of fees for two years, suspension was
imposed. The acts for which lawyers in the general population are repri-
manded and suspended are generally the same as the acts we have seen
among those who were subsequently disbarred.2 5 What then differentiates this
group of lawyers is a disaproportionately high percentage of reprimands and
suspensions. 26 This is not surprising, since the decision to disbar may have
been prompted by the fact that they had had prior encounters with the Law
Society and Discipline Committee. The part played by "prior encounters"
24 There is no data on the percentage of the Bar who have been the subject of
complaints. I was advised that even those in the largest firms have complaints lodged
against them. Some information on the incidence of complaints was given in a
statement by the Treasurer of the Law Society, see (1967) 1 THE LAW SOCIETY GAZETTE
56. In 1966, 474 complaints were considered. If we assumed there was one complaint
per person, at most 8% of the Bar would have been involved.
25 The Assistant Secretary of the Law Society indicated that lawyers had been
reprimanded for touting, acting for both sides, non-reply to Law Society letters and
failure to complete undertakings. Lawyers had been suspended for failure to complete
undertakings made to the Law Society, non-reply to letters, failure to attend at the
Law Society after notice to do so, and failure to complete a client's case. Except for
the inclusion of touting and acting for both sides, the pattern of behaviour of these
lawyers is similar to those who were subsequently disbarred.
26 In 1966, 3 lawyers were reprimanded and 1 suspended. (1967) 1 LAw SOCIETY
GAZETTE 56. This gives us some idea of the small percentage of the Bar so affected.
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in decision-making was brought out earlier when we indicated that the Law
Society had not articulated fixed sanctions for particular infractions of the
rules, so that cases received individual consideration.
As with complaints, behaviour which has resulted in a reprimand or
suspension could be relevant as an indicator of continuing trouble. The
effectiveness of reprimands and suspensions as such indicators can only be
guessed at, but in some cases, they have been so viewed by the Discipline
Committee.
Academic Career
The foregoing section focussed, to the extent allowed by the data, on
some of the difficulties the disbarred lawyers experienced in practice. We were
also able to get some information concerning academic performance; therefore,
we can consider, in part, the academic skills and knowledge with which these
individuals entered law practice and the possible relationship these had with
practice.2 7
Discussions of professions emphasize the importance of formal educa-
tion, for this period of systematically acquiring knowledge is a feature which
sets a profession apart from other occupational groups. In addition to knowl-
edge, a professional education also imparts standards of conduct; in effect,
a professional "way of life". But in the legal profession there may well be
a gap between theory and practice. Admission to law school was until recently
based on minimum academic qualifications. Character references are sub-
mitted, but they appear to be viewed as merely pro forma. (All the disbarred
lawyers had favourable character references in their academic files.)
In effect, then, neither the law schools nor the profession have any
guarantee that each is admitting only the individuals who will in time meet
professional conduct standards.28
Moreover, although it is in the law schools that training in a "way
of life" is supposed to begin, legal educators and writers query whether ethics
can be taught. Nevertheless, it is possible to see high academic performance
as a commitment to the "ethos" of the law.29
27 We do not have to consider, as did Carlin, variations among schools. For the
most part, these lawyers were educated in Ontario according to course requirements
set by the Law Society.
28 Ford, Notes on the Discipline Committee p. 26; see footnote 22. Ford cites
this as a factor among some of the lawyers coming before the Discipline Committee.
29 Rather than teaching ethics per se, one approach appears to be that the law
schools should indirectly promote the ethical practice of law. See, W. R. Lederman,
Law Schools and Legal Ethics, (1965) 8 CAN. B. j., p. 217-220. That high academic
achievement and commitment are felt to be related is reflected in an address to the
Council of Governing Bodies by the then Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper
Canada. "We aim at enlisting a class of men who can and will subordinate self-interest
to the client's interest... The highest educational attainment is in my opinion the
best preventative against defalcations." 1939 PROCEEDINGS CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
p. 170. See also Julius Stone, Report and Analysis of the Conference on Legal Education
and Public Responsibility. American Association of Law Schools, 1959, p. 90. "... [T]he
essential attitudes favourable to the assumption of public responsibility by lawyers,...
[are] acquired by the best students in the course of their straight law studies."
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TABLE 7
ACADEMIC HISTORY"
Average Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
B or higher: .............................................. 7 15%
C : ............................................................ 29 63 8
D : ............................................................ 10 22
Total ........................................................ 46 100%
Table 7 indicates that 85% of the disbarred lawyers had law school
averages of C or lower.
TABLE 8
SUPPLEMENTAL EXAMS
Number of Disbarred Percentage
Number of Supplementals Lawyers
1: .............................................................. 8 24%
2: .............................................................. 6 18
3: . ............................................................. 10 31 5
4 or m ore: ................................................ 9 27
Total ........................................................ 33 100%
Of the 49 lawyers3' whose files indicated a requirement of supplemental
examinations, 33 or 67% wrote these examinations. (These are examinations
which a student writes if he has failed a paper on the first try.) It will be
seen that the highest percentages in Table 8 are in the categories of three
or more supplementals, a total of 58% of all of those for whom information
was available.
Of the 49 lawyers for whom there was failure information, 14 (29%)
had failed one or more years at law school. It should be noted that there was
some overlap between those who wrote supplemental examinations and those
who failed.
The 85% of the disbarred lawyers who achieved C average or lower in
law school are not unlike a typical range of law students. However, we can
look at these results negatively and assert that very few of the disbarred lawyers
excelled academically at law school. What perhaps is more crucial is the
fact that 67% wrote one or more supplemental examinations, and 29% had
30 Academic information was available for 46 of the 80 lawyers. Of the 34 "don't
knows", 28 graduated prior to 1940 when no academic data was kept on file. Of the
remainder, 3 had supplemental and failure information only, 1 was a transfer from
another school, another simply lacked information and the last was a student who
was "disbarred" after his first year.
31 The three additional cases are those in which there was no over-all average
in the files, only supplemental and failure information.
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failed one or more years. These figures are likely much higher than those
found in the general law student population.32 Thus, it could be argued that
a high percentage of the disbarred lawyers did poorly at law school, a pat-
tern which could be reflected in their "failure" at the Bar. They were as
"marginal" at school as they subsequently were at practice.
The last factor pertaining to law school career is the age at which
the disbarred lawyers graduated. 72% graduated from law school in the
"typical" age period, that is, between 25-29. In this respect, then, they do
not differ from the general law school population.
Age and Number of Years in Practice
By looking at the age of the lawyer when he was disbarred we find
a somewhat more significant departure from the distribution of lawyers in
the general population.
TABLE 9
AGE WHEN DISBARRED
Number of Disbarred
Lawyers
Age
21 ........ .... ............... ............
20-34 ............................................................
35-39 ............................................................
40-44 ............................................................
45-49 ............................................................
50-54 ............................................................
55-59 ............................................................
60 or older ....................................................
Total ............................................................
*A student-He was "disbarred" in his first year
included him in the total.
Percentage
1*
15 19%
21 27
14 18
10 13
7 9
6 7
6 7
79 100%
at Law School, and we have not
32 We do not have comparable data against which to assess these results. There is
an unpublished study of 1960-66 law school graduates. While academic practices and
standards differ - fewer supplementals are allowed and fewer failures are allowed
to repeat - we can make some comments. This study indicates that 36% wrote
supplemental examinations in first year, 26% in second year and 11% in third year.
We do not know how many "new" students entered the ranks of supplemental writers
in second and third year, but it is likely less than the absolute percentages shown.
For example, it is rare for someone in third year to write a supplemental examination
if he has not had to write one before. Since we are only concerned, for the sake of
comparison, with the percentage writing any supplmentals during their school career,
we can assume that the precentage would not be much greater than 36%. It would
almost certainly be much less than the 67% of the disbarred lawyers who wrote
supplemental examinations. We offer the same suggestions in comparing the 1960-66
law students who failed at all during law school. 19% failed in first year, 6% in
second, and 2% in third year. 29% of the disbarred lawyers failed during law school.
This is higher than the 19% first year failures among the law students, even adding an
additional few to their ranks.
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The mean age of these lawyers was 43 which is consistent with the
average age of 42 for the lawyers in the 1961 Ontario Census. 33 However,
in our population, six lawyers between 63 and 79 probably distort the utility
of the average. Taking the mode as another way of placing the "typical"
disbarred lawyer, we found age 37 the most common, which places him as
someone who had been in practice approximately ten years.
Comparing this data with the age distribution of lawyers in the 1961
Ontario Census, we find 16% in the 35-39 category, 11% in the 40-44,
9% in the 45-49 and 14% in the 60± category.3 4 The remaining categories
display only a 1-2% difference from the distribution of disbarred lawyers.
The disbarred lawyers are over-represented in the first three categories
mentioned above.
A man between the ages of 35 and 39, in practice about 10 years,
has special features in his life situation which may contribute to disbarment.
He may well have been going through a difficult period of paying off debts
associated with his education, the establishment of his practice, and the
raising of a family. The peak earning period, which for lawyers begins about
age 45, has not yet arrived,3 5 and he may well be anxious to hasten its
arrival after ten years of indifferent financial rewards. This hypothesis is to
some extent borne out by the fact that the incidence of disbarment begins
to decline from age 50 on.
The fourth category, 60 years and over, is under-represented among the
disbarred lawyers. There were 7% in this category compared with 14%
in the general lawyer population. This under-representation may be explained
by the fact that while earnings may decline at this period so may expenses.
However, for those who were disbarred strains which occur at a later stage in
life, such as illness or inability to cope with the pressure of practice, appear
to have accounted for their disbarment.
Looking at the number of years these lawyers were in practice when
they were disbarred, we find further elaboration of the suggestions made above.
33 CENSUS OF CANADA, 1961, v. 3.1-11. pp. 137-8.
34 Id.
35 Nelligan, Income of Lawyers, 40; see footnote 1. NeUigan indicates that the
income in the first fifteen years of practice is lower than in the later years, even after
forty years in practice when incomes begin to decline. The peak is at about thirty
years. See also, Blaustein and Porter, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, p. 17 in which the peak
is said to fall at ages 50 to 54.
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TABLE 10
YEARS IN PRACTICE WHEN DISBARRED
Years in practice Number of Disbarred Percentage
Lawyers
2-5 ............................................................ 13 16%
6-10 .......................................................... 19 24 60%
11-15 ........................................................ 16 20
16-20 ........................................................ 10 13
21-25 ........................................................ 5 6
26-30 ........................................................ 10 13
31 or m ore ................................................ 6 8
Total ........................................................ 79 100%
Those in practice 21-25 years are the smallest and correspond to
those lawyers in the 45-49 age bracket. The percentage then rises to include
the 23% who were 50 years of age and over (see Table 9) who, we surmise,
experienced stresses and strains at this stage of life.
No one year of practice appeared to be the most common for the
disbarred lawyer, but three different years occurred more often than the
others. First, there were those who had been in practice five years when
disbarred; second, eight years; and third, eleven years. 36
These divisions suggested the possibility that those who had been dis-
barred in the first five years of practice might exhibit different patterns of
behaviour than those in the other two categories. For example, since they had
only been in practice five years or less when disbarred, perhaps factors
extraneous to their practice situation led to their subsequent involvement with
the Discipline Committee. That is, they brought to practice their pre-
professional ways of dealing with problems, while perhaps those disbarred
at a later stage in their career reacted more directly to its strains.
In general terms, those disbarred in the first 5 years of practice reflected
the patterns of the disbarred lawyer population. 77% of them were in solo
practice, all did "general" law, and 38 % were heavily involved in investments.
However, the effect of prior ways of handling problems in strained situations
was, no doubt, a factor for many of the lawyers, and was specifically evident
for some.
36 Carlin, LAwYmis' ETHICS; see footnote 2. Carlin found that 43% of the New
York City Bar were disciplined in the first ten years of practice. This is the highest
percentage breakdown in his table on p. 152. If we list our "years in practice" as he
did, the similarities are apparent.
YEARS IN PRACTICE ONTARIO NEW YORK
10 or less 40% 43%
11 to 20 33 37
21 to 30 19 16
31 or more 8 4
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In a later analysis we will look at two categories of disbarred lawyers:
60% who had been in practice from two to fifteen years at the time of
disbarment and the remaining 40% who had practised sixteen years and
more.
Personal and Social Data
Forty-four or 56% of the disbarred lawyers practiced in Metro Toronto
and 44% in the rest of Ontario. These figures are fairly representative of the
general lawyer population for that period.37 80% of all those for whom
information was available are Canadian born. Again, the population of
disbarred lawyers does not differ radically from the general lawyer population
with regard to place of birth.3 8
Of the 60 disbarred lawyers for whom data were available, 52% were
Protestant, 30% Roman Catholic and 17% Jewish. Since we do not know
what ethnic and cultural groups are included in the Protestant and Roman
Catholic categories of the disbarred lawyers, we cannot apply the Census
data. The 17% of the disbarred lawyers who are Jewish may appear to be
a disproportionately large group considering that the 1961 Canadian Census39
shows that 7% of all Canadian lawyers are Jews. However, we would hesitate
to make any conclusions based on this gross Canadian figure, since the per-
centage of Jewish lawyers in Ontario is almost certainly much higher
than 7%. This assumption is based on the fact that Ontario has a higher
percentage of Jews in its population than most provinces. However, no firm
figures could be obtained on the number of Ontario Jewish lawyers either
from the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, or from several Jewish organizations.
Information concerning marital status was available for 62 of the 80
disbarred. 79% were married, 11% separated or divorced and 10% single.
To compare our data with the 1961 Canadian Census, we grouped together
"married and separated" categories as they did. Thus, we have 55 "married"
or 89%, one divorced or 1% and 6 single, 10%. These findings are consistent
with those of the Census in which 86% were married, .4% divorced, 12%
single and 1% widowed.40 Our material did not indicate any widowers among
the disbarred.
In the files of 49 lawyers we were able to obtain data concerning father's
occupation. 35% were professionals' sons,4 ' 35% the sons of white collar
37The 1961 Census showed 53% of Ontario lawyers practised in Metro Toronto.
CENSUS OF CANADA, 1961, v. 3.1-4. p. 17.
38The 1961 Canadian Census indicates 90% of the lawyers are Canadian born.
These figures are for Canada as the Census does not give a breakdown for Ontario.
CENSUS OF CANADA, 1961. v. 3.1-15. pp. 3-4.
39 Id. There are no figures given for Ontario.
40 CENSUS OF CANADA, 1961, v. 3.1-11. p. 138.
41 Doctors, lawyers, the clergy, and engineers were classified as "professional".
As a matter of interest, four of the five lawyers were Q.C.'s. This raises some interesting
queries concerning the possible effect of a "successful" father on his son's subsequent
career, especially in the same field. This aspect will be explored later when professionals'
sons are looked at separately.
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workers,42 and 30% the sons of blue collar workers. 43 The percentages of
professionals' sons appeared high to us. Since 81% of our population were
solo practitioners, we though our findings ought to have been more consistent
with other studies of the legal profession 44 which show that solo practitioners
tend to come from non-professional families.
Separating the lawyers by year of graduation and father's occupation,
we were able to shed more light on our findings. Based on years of graduation,
we created a "postwar" group which was younger and had fewer years in
practice when disbarred than the "prewar" group.
45
TABLE 11
FATHER'S OCCUPATION AND YEAR OF GRADUATION
Pre-War and Wartime Grads Post-War Grads
Occupation Number Percentage Number Percentage
Professional ........................ 8 53% 9 27%
White Collar ........................ 3 20 14 41
Blue Collar .......................... 4 27 11 32
Total .................................. 15 100% 34 100%
For the post-war graduates the percentages are consistent with a typical
law school population. 46 It is understandable that a higher percentage of post-
war graduates are of white collar and blue collar backgrounds. In the imme-
diate post-war years, more money was available to students either through
the Department of Veterans Affairs' loans and/or the generally increased
incomes in these sectors of society. The breakdown for the post-war graduates
is what we would expect to find among a group of lawyers who were for
the most part, solo, general practitioners.
The pre-war and wartime graduates appear to reflect the general law
school population of their era in which law was a "gentleman's profession",
or, more accurately, when only those who were professionals could afford
to send their sons to university.
42 Sales, clerical and business occupations were classified as "white collar".
4 3 Farmers, skilled and unskilled labour were classified as "blue collar".
4 4 Carlin, LAWYERS' ETHICS, 28; see footnote 2. 13% of those in individual
practice were from a professional background. Also, Jack Ladinsky Careers of Lawyers,
Law Practice, and Legal Institutions, (1963) 28. AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVMW 48.
He found in his study of the Metropolitan Detroit Bar that solo practitioners were more
often of working class and entrepreneurial backgrounds than firm lawyers.
45 In this analysis (and hereafter) the terms "prewar" and "postwar" graduates are
used as a convenient technique of distinguishing those who were called to the Bar
before 1946, and those who were called after that date.
46 Te study of law school graduates (see footnote 32) shows a father's occupation
breakdown as follows:
Professional .................................................................... 22%
W hite Collar ................................................................ 57%
Blue Collar .................................................................... 23%
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To summarize then, the disbarred lawyers apparently do not differ
radically from the general lawyer population in terms of birth-place, religion
and marital status. The "father's occupation" breakdown also appears typical,
at least for the post-war graduates. Why, then, did these lawyers encounter
problems which subsequently resulted in their disbarment? It appears that
we have a strong argument thus far for the effects of a solo, general law
practice on the individual.
Professionals' Sons
We will now examine more closely those whom we might have expected
to be less vulnerable to the strains of a solo, general practice, and those who
might have avoided such strains altogether by entering a different type of
practice. The first group to fall within these categories is the sons of profes-
sional men. The other group, the "older graduates", will be examined in
the next section.
One could speculate that life experience in a "professional" family would
provide a lawyer with the attitudes and beliefs to help him resist the pressures
to seek success through means which are considered improper. Further, the
professional's son might well have the family background to help him engage
in a different type of practice, if he had wished to do so.
Of our total sample, 35% of the disbarred lawyers were professionals'
sons. To the extent that we were able to examine academic performance, we
found that all but two of these lawyers had low grades and wrote a number
of supplemental examinations. Such poor academic performance may well
have hindered any possibility regardless of family background to choose types
of practice other than a solo and general one. 80% entered solo practice,
practiced "lower-lever' law, and all were disbarred for acts in connection
with trust funds.
We might hypothesize that for these lawyers their status as professionals'
sons was detrimental, rather than beneficial. As a result of the professional
background, certain expectations about these lawyers' careers in law likely
existed, especially with regard to income level and prestige. However, the type
of practice in which they were engaged frustrated these expectations. The
tensions created by unrelinquished but impossible expectations might have
made trust funds appear as an inviting source of satisfaction.
Given this hiatus between what was expected by family and others and
what was achieved, these lawyers, unwilling to admit failure, may have
attempted to find a niche outside the system. Indeed this way of life would
likely be opposed to the system within which failure was experienced and
could be described as "the vindictive choice of a negative identity". 47 This
is probable since
... it is easier to derive a sense of identity out of a total identification with
47 See Eric Erikson, The Problem of Ego Identity in Maurice Stein, Arthur J.
Vidich and David M. White, IDNTTY AND ANxmTy, The Free Press, 1960.
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that which one is least supposed to be, than to struggle for a feeling of reality
in acceptable roles which are unattainable.. 48
The final act of converting trust funds, a negation of the trust position, is
vindicative in the sense that repudiates the values which have been held out
as desirable.
Others of these lawyers, who may have been unable to relinquish their
expectations, chose not vindictive opposition but loss of self-control as the
solution. 47% of these professionals' sons gave illness as a reason for their
behaviour, and another two, alcohol and gambling. In one sense these
"reasons" are a way of opting out of responsibility for deviant acts.49
The Older Disbarred Lawyer
We suggest that the behaviour of the older lawyers stemmed from
factors pertaining to their particular stage of life rather than from the strains
which seemed to characterize the group of disbarred lawyers as a whole.
We have separated the lawyers into pre- and post-war graduates. The average
age for the 39 pre-war or wartime graduates was 50 at the time of disbarment;
the average age of the 40 post-war graduates was 37. When disbarred, the
pre-war graduate had been practicing an average of 23 years, as compared to
8 years for the post-war graduate. Having practiced for such a length of time,
the older group was ostensibly one which was able to operate within the profes-
sional framework of the larger society.50
In an attempt to throw light on the sources of trouble for this older
group, we shall re-examine this sub-group with regard to the factors looked
at earlier in the article. Looking first at the reasons the Law Society gave for
disbarment, we do not find any difference between the pre- and post-war
graduates.
48 Id. 62.
49 1L K. Merton, soc.AL THEORY AND SOCIAL sTucruRE, 153-5. This conjecture is
based on part of Merton's "goal-means strain" hypothesis which is seen as a factor
in deviant behaviour.
50 Eight (20%) were Q.C.'s.
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TABLE 12
REASONS FOR DISBARMENT AND AGE
Pre-War and Wartime Grads
Why Disbarred Number Percentage
Misappropriation
of trust funds ................ 23 59%
Failure to account
for money received: .... 10 26
Other (neglect,
forgery, assault,
divorce collusion): ...... 6 15
Total ................................ 39 100%
Post-War Grads
Number Percentage
58%
25
7 17
40 100%
Although the "older" and "younger" graduates exhibit similar patterns
with respect to "number in firm when disbarred" their types of practice and
their incidence of involvement in "extra-legal" business differ.
TABLE 13
TYPE OF PRACTICE AND AGE
Pre-War and Wartime Grads
Practice Number Percentage
General ............................ 11 35%
Real Estate ...................... 11 35
Other* .............................. 10 30
Total ................................ 32 100%
Post-War Grads
Number Percentage
12 41%
17 59
29 100%
There is a more general distribution among the pre-war graduates in the
various types of law practice, while the post-war graduates are heavily
concentrated in real estate practice. This is perhaps an indication of how a
speculative real estate practice could be more of an influence on post-war
graduates than on their older colleagues.
TABLE 14
EXTRA-LEGAL BUSINESS AND AGE
Pre-War and Wartime Grads
Number Percentage
Involved ............................ 10 26%
Not-Involved .................... 29 74
Total ............................... 39 100%
Post-War Grads
Number Percentage
21 53%
19 47
40 100%
*Divorce, mining, labour, commercial/corporate
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The pre-war graduates were less involved with "extra-legal" business
and were only 32% of all those with "extra-legal" business involvements. Five
of the ten who had these involvements had mining investments as opposed
to those dealing with real estate. This is indicative of the type of speculation
which was prevalent in the 1940's and 1950's. Of the pre-war graduates, we
could say that they appear to have been less affected by the real estate and
speculative markets than their post-war confreres, at least, to the extent that
their legal life involved these aspects less. Thus, we will have to look elsewhere
for factors leading to their disbarment, accepting the premise that a real estate
practice and investments were among the factors for the other group.
The other factors, we would suggest, are found in what might be termed
the "life situation" of the older lawyer. These are the stresses and strains which
arise in middle age and beyond, and which have never been faced before;
for example, mental and physical deterioration or the loss of a spouse or
parent. Unable to handle these "new" situations, these men turned to alcohol,
gambling, or just let matters drift. The deviant act then is used as a solution
to a personal problem.51 We must keep in mind that primarily we are talking
of deviance in terms of the Law Society's standards. Thus, neglect or the
mixing of general and trust accounts become deviant acts regardless of what
prompted them.
The files of 38% of the pre-war graduates indicated that they were
physically and/or mentally ill, compared with 25% of the post-war graduates.
There is a higher incidence of physical illness among the older lawyers, as
we would expect to find in this age category. 80% of the post-war graduates
who were ill experienced mental strain. This could tie in of course with their
problems encountered in practice. Alcohol figured in the behaviour which led
to disbarment for 28V% of the pre-war graduates and gambling in two cases.
Among the post-war graduates, alcohol was mentioned in one case and
gambling in another. The low incidence of the use of alcohol among the
post-war graduates likely shows that they did not require this type of "escape"
from their problems and more actively sought solutions in speculation or the
immediate use of trust funds. The "older" lawyers, on the other hand,
escaped into alcohol and became careless or neglected their practice.52
Thus, we would argue that "personal disorganization" appears as a more
prevalent factor for the pre-war graduates, while the situational effects of a
real estate practice and its attendant opportunities, that is, land speculation,
were more instrumental in the disbarments of the post-war graduates.
51 See Bruno Cormier, et al., The Latecomer to Crime (1961) 3 cANADiAN JOURNAL
OF CORRECTIONS, for a discussion of this phenomenon.
52 Some typical comments in this area by the pre-war graduates are:
"Illness has taken me away from practice for several long periods in recent years."
"Went haywire - gambled".
"Combination of alcohol, own divorce and illness".
"Heavy drinking, money ran through fingers like water when on a drinking spree".
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Implications and Conclusion
Aspects of Social Control
In the first section of this paper we looked at the profession's rules and
standards of behaviour, and its rights and powers of enforcement. It was
noted that not all rules are actively enforced, nor are all infractions subject
to the same penalty. These differences, it was argued, depend upon the
essentiality of the norm for the profession's survival. Thus, infraction of those
norms which affect, and are usually accepted by the majority of the profes-
sion are invariably punished most severely. Related to this is the fact that
a professional society is located within the larger society. There is some reason
to believe that the infractions which the profession pursues and punishes most
severely are those which are related to the norms of the larger society.
An examination of the official rules and rulings of the legal profession
in Ontario pointed to a special concern with the "Rules Respecting Accounts".
These relate to the lawyer's responsibility for funds entrusted to him by clients.
As well, it is the area which is most actively enforced, and as the data analysis
has shown, violation of the "Rules" figures in 83% of the cases of those
disbarred.
Disbarment, primarily for trust fund violation, does not appear to be
peculiar to Ontario. Carlin's study of the New York City Bar shows that
32% of the disciplinary cases in the period 1929-62 involved clieit's financial
interests.5 3 32% is the highest percentage breakdown in this table, and the
percentage may well be higher if the cases of disbarment are segregated
from the other disciplinary procedures. An analysis of the legal profession
in England also indicates that disciplinary actions are primarily for violation
of the accounts regulations and for misappropriation.5 4
Yet, we know there are other areas of a lawyer's practice that concern
the organized profession. The Professional Conduct Handbook contains thirty-
five rulings relating to a wide variety of other matters, and there is a Profes-
sional Conduct Committee to consider novel problems of professional conduct
as they arise.
Why then does the area of trust fund obligations appear to stand out as
the most important for the profession? What accounts for the decision to
apply fairly consistently the "Rules Respecting Accounts"? In addition, why
are they applied so that those who break these Rules become the "outsiders"
of the profession through disbarment? To get at the basis of these decisions,
we must look at two features of the legal profession: its members have a
monopoly to render legal srvices, and thyare "trusted" by their clients.
The first point that should be emphasized is that the monopoly which
has been given is not absolute. Society can impose a number of sanctions on
53 Carlin, LAwms' ETHIcs, Table 134, p. 145. See footnote 2.
54 Quintin Johnstone and Dan Hopson, Jr., LAWYERS AND THEMIR WORK. AN ANALYSIS
or THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND. The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., 1967, 483.
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a professional group and its members.55 At a minimum, clients can "with-
hold the expressions of evaluative judgment" or deny prestige to lawyers. A
more severe sanction is to reduce the income of lawyers by using lay people
for jobs lawyers might otherwise do. Most importantly, government can
rescind some or all of the profession's power of self-government. As we noted
earlier, the Law Society's power to govern is given to it by statute and could
be amended. Succintly stated: ".... Professional autonomy is retained at the
pleasure of legislatures."56 It is to avoid the imposition of these sanctions that
the profession must remain sensitive to causes of client or public criticism of
lawyers.
One way in which client pressure is brought to bear is by complaints to
the Law Society about the conduct of lawyers thought to be dishonest or below
the level of competence that has been bargained for.57 By complaining to the
profession, the client not only exerts pressure on the individual lawyer but on
the whole profession to rectify the real or imagined wrong that has been done
to him. The existence of an organization to receive complaints and follow
them through bespeaks the profession's awareness, possibly of their respon-
sibility, and certainly of the repercussions of ignoring complaints.
Secondly, if lawyers are "trusted" persons, the question must be asked
how this trust obligation can be policed. In many instances, what seems to
be a violation may, on investigation by a "competent" person, turn out to
be innocent. Thus, the majority of the complaints to the Law Society were
considered and dismissed.58 Typically, the Law Society obtained the lawyer's
explanation and found that his work actually was satisfactory. The lawyer
may not have reported to the client as often or as fully as he might have,50
nor have given a detailed accounting of disbursements and fees, but the job
itself was done.
This sequence underlines the difficulty of enforcing standards of pro-
fessional behaviour. In many instances, the public is not in a position to judge
what has been done by those whom it "trusted". What the client asks the
lawyer to do for him, ostensibly, is what he cannot do for himself. The
55 P. 1. Giffen, Social Control and Professional Self-Government: A Study of the
Legal Profession in Canada in UxANSM AND THE CHANGING CANADIAN SOCIETY, S. D.
Clark, (ed.), University of Toronto Press, 1961, 120-3.
56 Id. 123. '
57 Generally, these complaints would be instituted by clients. In some instances
a lawyer or a local bar association will be involved if the aggrieved client has gone
to them first. If the client goes to another lawyer to handle his problem, then this lawyer
will likely advise the Law Society of the situation.
58These complaints concerning delays, non-receipt of money in a collection
matter or non-accounting of disbursements and fees, for example, are generally
dismissed after investigation and sometimes prodding by the Law Society.
59 See C. I. Scott, On Keeping Clients Informed, (1967) 1 THE LAW socInTY
GAZETME 35. Orie Phillips and Philbrick McCoy, THE CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS,
Parker and Co., 1952, at p. 113, report this as one of the two most common complaints
against lawyers which they say is not the proper subject for the institution of disciplinary
action and could be reduced by taking the apparent precautions. We assume that this
is not necessarily seen as an indication of professional misconduct.
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"expert" is asked to handle the task because of his expertise, and he is
authorized to do it in the manner he sees fit. Implicit in this reliance on the
expert is the expectation that the best will be done for the client. However,
the client may be in no position to evaluate the service rendered. For
example, instances of negligent handling of cases in the form of delays,
loss of a right of action through a missed limitation period, inadequate
recovery and collusion in settling cases no doubt all occur.
There are difficulties in assessing and detecting the "negligence" aspects
not only for the client but for the profession as well. First, client dissatisfaction
appears to be a built-in hazard in the practice of law.60 It is not unusual for
clients to feel that their cases are moving too slowly or that they did not
receive enough money in settlement. There is, therefore, a tendency to
discount such complaints. Secondly, the fact that a lawyer has missed a
limitation period may never be known to the client; he might simply be told
that his case has been lost "on technical grounds" or for some other accurate
but unenlightening reason. Third, the Law Society may find it difficult to
evaluate information related by dissatisfied clients or by lawyers, which
usually cannot be corroborated by objective facts. For all of these reasons,
policing professional competence may be almost impossible.
Trust fund obligations pose an entirely different picture. This is one
area in which a lay person is well able to judge, since defalcations, once
detected, can be easily assessed especially by the injured client. He has handed
over a certain sum of money and expects its return. When this is not forth-
coming, or when he has received a document which turns out to be forged,
he soon will know that he has been "taken". In other words, the breach of
trust can be objectively validated. This is particularly true of clients, who,
like the defaulting lawyer, are skilled businessmen or speculators; but even
the ordinary individual is able to realize that his lawyer has not treated him
as he expected to be treated.
Violation of trust fund obligations is an act by which the client's best
interests are ignored so that the trustee's can be advanced. It is not difficult to
imagine the outrage this action would incur against the trustee, both personally
and as a member of a group. Therefore, with the threat of sanctions from
the public, government and "encroachers", and the visibility of trust fund
violations making these threats real, we have seen active efforts to police and
enforce trust fund honesty in law practice. The profession has announced
to the public the lawyer's responsibility in this area by instituting the Com-
pensation Fund. This was the profession's acknowledgement that failure
of the governing body to take adequate measures to curb or control fraud
and defalcation would lead to protests which might endanger the profession's
60 Talcott Parsons, The Law and Social Control in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY, WM. M.
Evan, (ed). The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962, 65. Parsons points to some of the elements
in the lawyer's role which produce this dissatisfaction. He sees the lawyer's role as one
with inherent strains since he acts in those areas in which there are no absolute "right"
answers. His function in relation to clients is ".... often to resist their pressures and
get them to realize some of the hard facts of their situations .... with reference to
what the law will permit them to do" Parsons A Sociologist Looks at the Legal
Profession in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGiCAL THEORY. The Free Press, 1964, 384.
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right of self government. When the Compensation Fund for victims of
defaulting lawyers was discussed by the Treasurer of the Law Society, he
indicated that without this Fund run by the Law Society, its members would
be subjected to some external regulation. 61
A final aspect of trust fund violation is its correspondence to "ordinary"
honesty norms. 62 It is not lawful to steal another's property no matter where
one is located in society. This standard of behaviour is not peculiar to the
legal profession as is the case with, say, fee-splitting or touting. Moreover,
there is little of a professional lawyer's skill involved in handling money.
Trust funds have been turned over to the lawyer to hold or to use in the
client's interest. The client asks the lawyer to act in his place, if not accord-
ing to professional ethics, at least according to the standards binding on all
members of society. Because it is part of a lawyer's work to receive money
in this way, although others can perform this function as well, the Law
Society may be concerned to avoid either the public censure of its members,
or loss of the "trust" function to speculators, investment counsellors, or
banks. However, the Law Society has indicated that at a certain point a lawyer
may be so involved in the "business" of speculation that he is outside the
"profession" of law. At that point, the Law Society simply seeks to disas-
sociate itself from the individual by disbarment and will not concede that
the legal profession should be held accountable for his wrongs. In these cases,
no relief can be obtained from the Compensation Fund.63
The Career of the Disbarred Lawyer
As our data indicated, the disbarred lawyers were, for the most part,
solo, general practitioners. In order to understand why this type of lawyer
is so highly represented in this deviant population, we must see him in
relation to the rest of the profession. In this way, his particular situation will
be highlighted.
It is quite evident that we cannot simply speak of "a profession" as if it
were a homogeneous group. On the other hand, in a particular context, for
example in a discussion of "profession" versus "business", the term does serve
a useful purpose. Certain broad differentiating features of each category
61 Law Society of Upper Canada, MINUES oF CONVOCATION, Jan. 15, 1960,
p. 29. Johnstone and Hopson, p. 506; see footnote 55. The same rationale was voiced
by the governing body of solicitors in England when their Compensation Fund was
instituted. The authors state the Society's main motivation was the maintenance of
public confidence in the profession when incidents of dishonesty occurred. "Basically it
is a public relations measure."
62 Carlin, LAWYERS' ETICS, 166; see footnote 2. He points out that it is the
ordinary standards of morality which are most often enforced by the organized
Bar, not those peculiar to the Bar alone.
639ee Report Re: [name deleted] - Compensation Fund (1965?, undated report
to Convocation by Discipline Committee); "In our view, the Compensation Fund does
not exist to cast its protection over the criminals who are lawyers for the benefit of
all who choose to deal with them for high returns but to those who use lawyers for
normal purposes and returns and who, suffering damage through their dishonesty,
have no redress... [name deleted] was regarded and used by some, not as a lawyer
but as a mortgage broker or investment finder ......
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could then be identified and fruitfully compared. Thus, we can point to the
existence of specialized training over a period of time among professionals;
the acknowledged profit motive among businessmen; a service orientation
among professionals. While "caveat emptor" with attendant public judgment
may characterize the business world, the professional world is said to be one
in which responsibility is placed with the professional to do his best for his
client. As has been noted, the client is often unable to judge the nature of the
work done for him. Thus, a trust element is expected to exist between the
client and the professional and it is the latter's responsibility to see that this
trust is maintained.
However, once we have sketched in these two groups, analyses of
specific situations often show that we are dealing with "ideal-types". The
distinction between professional and business groups is not all that clear-cut.
We would be hard pressed to assert that professionals do not hope to make
a profit in their dealings with clients. What may separate the professional from
the businessman is an attitude toward the way in which profit is made. This
attitude may well be fostered by institutionalized ways of "doing business".
In other words, there are rules according to which one is expected to operate
-expected by the professional group, the public and no doubt by the
individual in practice.
Yet, if we focus on the legal profession itself, we will note that some
members are more "professional" than others. If we can picture a continuum
from business to profession, some lawyers will fall closer to the "pure" pro-
fessional end, and others closer to the "pure" business end. As one would
expect, each could be defined by the type of work he does, with whom, and
for whom it is done. The pure professional is most often exemplified by the
lawyer in the large law firm, handling complex specialized problems for cor-
porations or for individuals with many business involvements. Near the other
end of the continuum is the quasi businessman lawyer, often in solo practice.
It is interesting to note this shift of the prototype "professional" from
his historic role of the free, independent practitioner serving the individual
client, to those who are members of large firms servicing large corporate
clients. The paradox is that the latter is freer.6 4 He can organize his time and
choose the work and clientele he wishes. That he can do the latter with some
ease rests on the fact that he has a broader range from which to chose, and
the division of labour within an organization provides opportunity for
specialization or concentration in particular areas of practice. The solo
practitioner, on the other hand, depends on the work he alone attracts; and
by the very fact of being alone, he must offer his service in all areas of the
law. Neither is he supported by such organizational amenities as "juniors",
law clerks and titie searchers, who do routine and time-consuming work.
We realize that we have excluded here one type of solo practitioner. This
is the specialist. He concentrates in one area of law, and his clients are
64 Erwin, 0. Smigel, THE WALL STREET LAwYER. The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964,
pp. 322-338. Smigel argues in Chapter 11 that in service to his client, the most crucial
area of practice, this lawyer is free to do his best.
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referred to him by other lawyers. His "freedom" again rests with his ability
to restrict both the type of work he does and his clientele. He is not dependent
on the "passing trade" for his income, but rather on his colleagues who are
the basis of his referrals. It is only the lawyer who is firmly entrenched in
the colleague network who can afford to remain in this type of practice.
With regard to our discussion of the "quasi-businessman" lawyer, our
data suggested two examples. There are those who represent individual
clients for single transactions and those representing the speculator and
investor, usually over a long period. Many of the problems of the former
type can be, and often are, handled by non-lawyers such as mortgage brokers,
real estate brokers, accountants, insurance adjusters and trust company
employees, or indeed, by the client acting alone without advice. Thus, the
solo lawyer practises in areas in which there is lay competition, which makes
his income tenuous.
The other group of lawyers falling near the business end of the con-
tinuum is one whose practice is in the "non-law" sphere as well. These lawyers
act for clients with large land-holdings which are usually turned over quickly
for speculative purposes. Here, the lawyer's income and his involvement are
not so tenuous. In fact, he is in effect on retainer to his clients to the extent
that he often has a personal investment in their deals. It is in this respect
that this lawyer is less a "professional".
The solo lawyer in general practice (which includes over 80% of the
disbarred lawyers in this study) appears to be in a "marginal" position in
almost every respect. On our imaginary continuum, he appears to rest some-
where between the businessman and the lawyer. By formal training and by
virtue of his license he is a lawyer. Yet, the nature of his work does not
separate him very distinctly from the businessman. At the one extreme he is
engaged in emulating them, and at the other he is in a form of competition
with them. Within the Bar itself, while a member, he is not part of the
"inner core" which enjoys probably to a full extent the fruits of professional
status in terms of income and prestige. He is the recipient of the work the
large firms or individual specialists shun either tacitly by referral or directly
by refusal. 65 In terms of his power position, as an index of his status, this
solo practitioner is likely without a voice in formulating and enforcing
standards of professional conduct.66
As one writer sees it, the "normal" person is able to check his deviant
impulses because his involvement in conventional institutions and behaviour
means that he has too much to lose by yielding to them.67 But the solo
practitioner has "marginal" involvement. His law practice is not bound up
with the legal community, nor is he buttressed by an organization. The latter
65 Id. 271.
66 See Arthur Wood, Professional Ethics Among Criminal Lawyers, (1959) 7
7 SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 80. In his study, Wood found a greater preponderance of high
income lawyers and Protestanflawyers as members of the Grievance Committees.
67 Howard S. Becker, oursmmis, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966, 27; and also,
Notes on the Concept of Commitment, (1960) 66 AmncEAN JouRNAL OF SOCIOLOGY.
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offers not only informal support through the easy accessibility of colleagues
but formal support in the person of bookkeepers, auditors, office managers,
and the use of double signatures on cheques. We could say then, that these
lawyers did not have as much to lose as many of their colleagues in the
profession who are more tied to the institutions than they. In fact, a number
of those disbarred, appeared to define themselves out of the profession and its
commitments by seeing themselves less as lawyers and more as businessmen.
Those measures of attracting business and making money which are available
to the businessman may become very tempting to the lawyer in this situation.
The use of trust funds viewed from a different perspective can be seen
as a way of meeting financial needs and desires. The fact that he practises
alone makes their use feasible. The lawyer takes the risk, likely hoping that by
the time there is a demand for the money, he will have replaced it.68
For the investor, a slightly different course of events could have occurred.
He made a number of "side-bets" which would be too expensive to lose.69
For example, the lawyer who began to speculate may not have had any
intention of using his client's trust funds to finance his undertakings. However,
once involved in speculation, he may not have had enough of his own money
to follow through. To back off would mean a financial loss, possibly in the
face of other involvements which were contingent on this one. Thus, the
initial situation, speculation, gets bound up with a number of other factors.
The use of trust funds, then, is one way to meet this problem. It is likely
preferable to bankruptcy which could further restrict the ladwyer's practice,
or perhaps end it altogether.70 The former alternative has the possibility of
"working" if the deal goes through before the client needs his money. It is a
calculated risk.
Within this general framework, we can identify the significant phases of
the disbarred lawyer's career. The sequence of movements in which he went
from law student, to lawyer, to non-lawyer can be pointed to, so that dis-
barment is not seen as an isolated event, but a logical sequel to prior
experiences and activities.
As a law student, the disbarred lawyer did poorly. This may be an
indication of actual intellectual limitation which could cause him difficulties
as a lawyer. Some of the students pleaded "nerves" every year at examination
time, which is another hint of how these individuals reacted under pressure,
a feature certainly present in practice. In addition, poor academic achievement
is often a bar to acceptance in "better" law firms where monetary and other
68 With the situation re-defined, the prevailing professional standards appear to be
"loosened." One writer has noted that "... [Rlisktaking, rather than deviation, is
perceived by the conflicting person as a 'way out' ". See Edwin M. Lemert, SOCIAL
STRUCTURE, SOCIAL CONTROL AND DEVIATION, in Marshall Clinard, ANOME AND DEVIANT
BEHAviOuR, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964-72.
69 Becker, Notes on the Concept of Commitment, 35-6; see footnote 67.
70 If a lawyer goes into bankruptcy, the Law Society may not permit him to
handle trust funds. For a lawyer in general practice, this measure would eliminate
a large part of his practice. See, PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT HANDBOOK, Rules Respecting
Accounts. Rule 12.
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professional rewards can be obtained.71 Therefore, this type of law student,
although an acknowledged lawyer on graduation, begins his career with rather
restricted promise of rewards.
The lawyers we have just described likely gravitate into a solo, general
practice, with its limitations, strains and risks. That they go into this type of
practice may be a result of the actual barriers to other types of practice and
the way in which they view their situation. They may feel that because of their
academic history, solo, general practice is best suited to them and they avoid
entry into other areas.
Once in a solo, general practice, they live with the situation which
exists. As we have seen, this situation can be one outside the colleaguial
network, either business-oriented, or providing low income. The strains and
risks which appear to be a feature of this situation may make alternative
means of success attractive. The opportunity to speculate or to use trust funds
to meet speculative and personal debts can be viewed as one such means.
The fact of practising alone and the availability of funds makes this behaviour
possible.
We noted that complaints, reprimands and suspensions figured in the
career of these disbarred lawyers. The difficulties experienced in practice
are indicated here. Disbarment, for most of them, was not their first encounter
'with the Law Society. For example, some of the complaints and lesser
sanctions showed that the lawyer had a history of mixing trust and personal
funds. Disbarment for trust fund violations appears to have been an extension
of this prior activity. On a subjective level, we can imagine the lawyer not
seeing too much difference between simply mixing personal and trust funds
and using these mixed funds for his own purposes, always with the intention
of repayment. However, typically this lawyer would be caught short and asked
to return the client's money before he was in a position to repay it.
For those receiving complaints, reprimands, and suspensions for delays
and non-reporting, we again see some difficulties in adherence to the profes-
sion's standards. Disbarment for "neglect" appears to have been viewed by
the Law Society as a means of ending a history of such behaviour.
The professionals' sons may have experienced added difficulties. Enter-
ing law with certain aspirations, their generally poor academic performance
initially restricted them. They may have felt some obligation to follow their
fathers' career and yet not really desired to do so. The strains of this
relationship, or the strains associated with limited ability in a situation for
which they were not suited, may well have been one step in their movement
71 For those of an "ethnic" and/or non-professional background, additional
contingencies would be relevant. Their likely unfamiliarity with professional mores may
affect internalization of the standards which the profession expects. As we have noted,
this task is not completely performed within the law schools. Their background also
may bar their acceptance into the law firms which can guarantee and support professional
rewards and standards. As well, their potential client "contacts" cannot generally
provide a high and sustained professional income, but rather individual, small-scale
transactions, or non-professional business opportunities.
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toward the activity for which they were disbarred. We noted earlier that some
of them pleaded illness as a reason for their behaviour. Apparently, they
could not accept responsibility for the steps which they had taken. That is,
as lawyers they should not have acted in the way they did, but because they
were ill, they had no other choice.
In our discussion of the "older" and "younger" disbarred lawyers,
there were apparently different career lines. Given the fact that many of the
"older" lawyers may have been in solo, general practice from graduation
until disbarment (an average of twenty-three years) they seemingly had
operated successfully within this situation. Their younger colleagues, on the
other hand, appear to have been adversely affected.
What appears relevant for the older lawyers is the onset of factors
associated with age which appears to have triggered their subsequent behaviour
patterns. Physical illness, much more prevalent for them than for the younger
lawyers, appeared to affect their ability to cope with practice. Once ill, they
began to ignore cases and forget undertakings. Then complaints were lodged.
The situation might have appeared to them as too difficult to handle, and so
the cycle kept repeating itself until they were disbarred.
The higher incidence of the use of alcohol among these older lawyers72
also appeared to be associated with age. Their practice situation may well
have been difficult for them for many years, and they may have been drinking
to ease its burdens. It could well be that a number of years of consistent,
heavy drinking elapsed before alcohol had the effect of incapacitation. On
the other hand, these lawyers may have begun to drink heavily at a later stage
in life when certain pressures arose. Added to a possible deteriorating physical
and mental condition, the effect of alcohol could be so deleterious as to affect
the individual's ability to carry on his practice.
Since our focus has been on the disbarred lawyer, we have emphasized
those aspects of his career which appear relevant to the behaviour for which
he was subsequently sanctioned as well as the points in the careers of these
lawyers at which a step in one direction is likely a determinant of subsequent
steps.
What we have seen is the interaction between the situation of the solo
lawyer in general practice and the special concern by the profession about
trust fund activities. One cannot help but speculate about who would be
involved if this concern were to focus on other areas of practice such as fee-
splitting, touting or negligence. It seems likely that the same type of lawyer
would be affected. As in society at large, it is the lower stratum which most
often encounters the enforcement agencies. They are without the institutional
supports enjoyed in other sectors. For the solo lawyer, the combined effect
of competition and the complexities of practising alone without the support
of colleagues and clients who demand scrupulousness, would likely bring
him into contact once again with the governing body of the Law Society.
72 28% of the "older" lawyers indicated alcohol as a factor in their behaviour,
compared with one "younger" lawyer.
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